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# Effects of Human Capital on Farm and Non-Farm Productivity and Occupational Stratification in Rural Pakistan\*

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## Abstract

This paper investigates the effects of human capital on productivity using micro panel data of rural households in the North-West Frontier Province, Pakistan, where a substantial job stratification is observed in terms of income and education. To clarify the mechanism underlying this stratification, the human capital effects are estimated for wages (individual level) and for self-employed activities (household level), and for farm and non-farm sectors. Estimation results show a clear contrast between farm and non-farm sectors — wages and productivity in non-farm activities rise with education at an increasing rate, whereas those in agriculture respond only to the primary education.

*Keywords:* human capital, returns to education, non-farm employment, self-employment.

*JEL classification codes:* O12, J24, Q12.

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# 1 Introduction

In rural areas in contemporary developing countries, non-farm activities are becoming more important in determining the welfare of households (Lanjouw and Lanjouw, 2001). As a result, we often observe job stratification with a substantial income disparity between those who were successful in finding non-farm, lucrative jobs and those who were not. Underlying this stratification is a response of rural households in labor allocation to new economic opportunities, considering returns to human capital, which may differ from activity to activity. When farmers decide on their children's schooling, they are usually motivated by the desire of finding non-farm, lucrative jobs for their children. Therefore, investment in human capital in rural areas is more closely related with non-farm activities (Huffman, 1980; Yang, 1997; Fafchamps and Quisumbing, 1999; Lanjouw, 1999; Lanjouw and Lanjouw, 2001; Yang and An, 2002).

This paper is an empirical attempt to quantify the difference of returns to human capital across rural activities. Namely, the effects of human capital on farm and non-farm productivity are investigated for different educational stages and for different economic activities, using micro panel data of rural households in Pakistan's North-West Frontier Province (NWFP). The case of NWFP is particularly interesting because the weakness of economic development in South Asia is concentrated in this region — the incidence of income poverty is high and the deprivation in human development indicators is more serious than indicated by income growth. Another reason for studying NWFP economy is the general paucity of rigorous economic research on Pashtun society, which spreads over NWFP and Afghanistan.

The major contribution of this paper to the human capital literature in development economics is that a clear contrast between sectors and between employment statuses is shown through its comprehensive coverage of rural activities after controlling for endogenous selection. This study is one of the few studies that apply the methodology of selection correction for polychotomous choice models to datasets from developing countries.<sup>1</sup> The rural economic activities are broadly classified into four: non-agricultural wage/salary employment, agricultural wage employment, non-agricultural self-employment, and agricultural self-employment. The empirical model is close to that of Yang (1997), who estimated non-linear production functions for farm value-added and linear wage functions for non-farm wage earnings. Unlike Yang (1997), however, this paper attempts to include non-farm enterprises and agricultural

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<sup>1</sup>See Glewwe and Jacoby (1994) for such an example applied to schooling decisions in developing countries.

wages and to incorporate non-linear impacts corresponding to educational stages.

To investigate the difference according to economic sectors, i.e., agriculture vs. non-agriculture, comparable models of returns to human capital are estimated for all sectors that are relevant for rural households when they allocate labor force. In the recent literature, Jolliffe (2002) estimated the effects of several alternative measures of household education on household income, differentiated into farm and non-farm income. This paper adopts more detailed decomposition of household income sources than he did.

In characterizing returns to human capital in the rural setting of developing countries, due attention should be paid to the importance of self-employment (Newman and Gertler, 1994). Therefore, this paper examines carefully how the education effects on productivity differ according to employment status, i.e., the wage level vs. the productivity of self-employed enterprises. Among recent studies, Nielsen and Westergård-Nielsen (2001) estimated the effect of education on individual earnings, differentiated into wage and self-employment income sources. This paper is distinguished from their work by allowing returns to labor to be non-linear, differentiating returns to labor from returns to assets used in self-employed activities, and imputing income from consumption of own farm products properly.

Another contribution of this paper is to give a clue to the controversy regarding the effects of education on farm productivity. Since Schultz (1961) emphasized the role of education in improving farm efficiency and in modernizing agriculture, microeconomic studies to test his hypothesis have been accumulated, showing mixed results from developing countries (Lockheed et al., 1980; Jamison and Lau, 1982; Yang, 1998). In the case of rural Pakistan, Fafchamps and Quisumbing (1999) found that private returns to education in farming are insignificant, whereas Kurosaki and Fafchamps (2002) demonstrated that the effects of schooling years on crop yields per acre are significantly positive. Why have some studies found positive effects of education on farm productivity while others have not? This paper gives one possible answer by allowing the effects of education to differ across different levels of education and at different aggregation levels of farm activities. It is found that the effect of education is stronger at more aggregate levels, suggesting the importance of human capital for efficient factor allocation within a farm.

The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the key features of labor allocation and educational achievement in the study area. Section 3 proposes empirical models to quantify the effects of education on productivity. Section 4 shows estimation results for the four broadly classified activities. Section 5 concludes the paper.

## 2 Data and Key Features Identified in the Field

### 2.1 Data

This paper employs a panel dataset compiled from a sample household survey implemented in 1996 and 1999 in three villages in the Peshawar District of Pakistan's NWFP. NWFP is one of the four provinces of Pakistan. Compared with Punjab, which is the center of agriculture and related industries, and Sind, where the metropolitan city of Karachi is located, NWFP and Baluchistan could be characterized as economically backward provinces. The incidence of income poverty (headcount index) in rural NWFP is estimated at 46.5% in 1998/99 (World Bank, 2002), which is the highest in Pakistan.

Since NWFP is a relatively land-scarce province with limited scope for agriculture-led sustained growth, human capital is expected to play a more important role in poverty eradication. Yet, even in terms of human development, the province is behind the other two provinces. Literacy rates in NWFP, especially of females, are much lower than in Sind and Punjab, and NWFP is lagging behind Punjab and Sind in infant mortality rates also. This disparity, i.e., human development poverty being more serious than income/consumption poverty, is a notorious characteristic of South Asia as well as Pakistan, to which various issues of UNDP's *Human Development Reports* drew attention. This paper focuses on rural NWFP because this is a region where this disparity is stark.

Details of the first survey are given by Kurosaki and Hussain (1999) and those of the second survey are given by Kurosaki and Khan (2001). The reference period for each survey is fiscal years 1995/96 and 1998/99 respectively.<sup>2</sup> In choosing sample villages in 1996, we controlled for village size, socio-historical background, and tenancy structure. At the same time, to ensure that the cross section data thus generated would provide dynamic implications, we carefully chose villages with different levels of economic development. The first criterion was agricultural technology. One of the three sample villages was rainfed, another semi-irrigated, while the other was fully-irrigated. Another criterion was that the selected villages be located along the rural-urban continuum so that it would be possible to decipher the subsistence versus market orientation of farming communities in the study area.

Table 1 summarizes characteristics of the sample villages. Village A is rainfed and is located some distance from main roads. This village serves as an example of the least

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<sup>2</sup>Pakistan's fiscal year as well as its agricultural year is the period from July 1 to June 30.

developed villages. Village C is fully irrigated and is located close to a national highway, so serves as an example of the most developed villages. Village B is in between. Sample households in each village were selected randomly from each type of household classified by their farm operating status: *non-farm* households (with no operated land for cropping)<sup>3</sup> and farm households that include *owner*, *owner-cum-tenant*, and *pure tenant* farm households. The distinction among farm households enables us to decipher the effects of land assets on household welfare.

Out of 355 households surveyed in 1996, 304 were resurveyed in 1999. The most frequent reason for attrition was migration. Some households have migrated out from the village and others have sent all their adult males to work in foreign countries or in Pakistani cities. Among those resurveyed, three had been divided into multiple households, resulting in the total number of resurveyed households in 1999 as 309.<sup>4</sup> In 1999, additional 43 households were also surveyed as “replacement” samples. This paper, therefore, employs an unbalanced panel of 398 households, of which 301 are re-surveyed households without household division and 299 are those panel households with complete and comparable information.<sup>5</sup>

Table 1 also shows characteristics of the panel households. Average household sizes are larger in Village A than in Villages B and C, reflecting the stronger prevalence of an extended family system. Average landholding sizes are also larger in Village A than in Villages B and C. Since the productivity of purely rainfed land is substantially lower than that of irrigated land, effective landholding sizes are comparable among the three villages. As is shown in the average household income or consumption per capita, the living standard is the lowest in Village A and the highest in Village C.<sup>6</sup>

In the sample villages, yields of wheat (staple food) are not only low on average (the overall mean was 690 kg/ha in the unirrigated village and 1,760 kg/ha in the irrigated vil-

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<sup>3</sup>“Non-farm” households are defined by the land operation status. Therefore, several households who did not operate any land but worked as farm laborers for wage or kept livestock are classified as “non-farm” households.

<sup>4</sup>In the survey, a household is defined as a unit of coresidence and shared consumption. A typical joint family in the region, where married sons live together with the household head who owns their family land along with their wives and children, is treated as one household as long as they share a kitchen. When the household head dies or becomes aged, the land may be distributed among sons, who start to live separately on that occasion. In our survey when we encounter such cases, each family of each son is counted as one household.

<sup>5</sup>See Appendix 2 for the determinants of attrition.

<sup>6</sup>During the three years since the first survey, Pakistan’s economy suffered from macro-economic stagnation with rising poverty (World Bank, 2002), which hurt the NWFP economy the most severely. Reflecting these macroeconomic shocks, the general living standard declined in the study villages during the period of this study.

lages) but also fluctuate widely. The share of wheat consumption met from own production was less than 30% in the rainfed village (Village A) where wheat yield is the lowest. Even in Villages B and C where wheat yields are higher, the average percentage was low, in the range from 20 to 47% (Kurosaki and Hussain, 1999). This situation is attributable to the low productivity of wheat in Village A and the meager size of land holding in Villages B and C. In the study area, however, grain markets are well developed, where wheat is available throughout the year at stable prices thanks to public intervention (Kurosaki, 1996). Therefore, marginal farmers would be better off with higher food security by growing vegetables on their land and by increasing non-farm employment, rather than by growing wheat to the limit on their marginal land.

## 2.2 Labor Force Allocation and Human Capital

Information on personal details was collected from every household member and every family member who remitted regularly to the household. The information includes age, sex, educational background, regular working status, primary occupation, secondary occupation, average monthly wages/earnings from employment, and so on.

Table 2 shows the distribution of working household members by their employment status. From those household members whose age is 15 years and above, students, retired people, and the unemployed are excluded, giving the total number of working members at 1,591 for the total 355 households in 1996 and 1,606 for the total 352 households in 1999.<sup>7</sup> Based on each individual's primary occupation, the table classifies the employment status into five categories: household work, non-agricultural wage/salary employment, agricultural wage employment, non-agricultural self-employment, and agricultural self-employment.

Agriculture is traditionally the most important source of employment in the study region. Because there are few large scale farms that are completely dependent on hired labor, most of those engaged in agriculture are self-employed. Their labor is sometimes supplemented by hired labor. Non-agricultural self-employment activities, or non-farm enterprises, are diverse: traditional, caste-based services in rural South Asia such as carpenters, barbers, and blacksmiths (approximately 13% of the individuals self-employed in non-farm enterprises); low-capital, low-end jobs such as snack hawkers and shoe polishers (15%); and

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<sup>7</sup>Below the age of 15, no female children were reported to have primary occupation, while 37 male children, aged 10-14, or 8.4% of that age group, were associated with primary occupation. Among them, 10 worked on their parents' farm, four on their parents' non-agricultural enterprises, two on others' farms, and 21 were employed in non-agricultural wage jobs, mostly in low-paid sectors.

those that require relatively large initial capital such as arms trading, general shops, wheat mills, and nursery shops (57%). Transportation service is also common (15%), which covers all three types listed above. Non-agricultural wage/salary employment are also diverse, including daily construction work, wage employment in those listed as non-agricultural self-employment activities, and office/shop work in the nearby towns. Since the size of establishments is universally small for those employees, we may classify them according to their contract duration — approximately 55% of the non-farm employees were hired casually on daily basis, while the rest were hired regularly.

Among males, employment in non-agriculture and self-employment in agriculture are more frequently found than the other two. The concentration of female workers on the category “household work” reflects the effects of *purdah*, the custom of social seclusion of women in South Asia. The custom is maintained more strictly in rural NWFP where Pashtun codes of maintaining family honor reinforce it (Ahmed, 1980). Because of the prevalence of *purdah*, male household heads in the study area prefer female family members not to work outside; when the female members work domestically in productive activities, the heads do not recognize their work as economically productive unless they are engaged in the marketing stage also, which is very rare. As a result, the number of female household members who are engaged in “household work” is abnormally high in Table 2.<sup>8</sup> Because of this distortion, we focus only on male labor allocation and the effects of human capital on it in the following analysis.

Panel B of Table 2 shows the level and composition of household income corresponding to the labor allocation in Panel A. The average household income excluding transfers and remittances is approximately Rs. 70,500, or US\$ 1,800, for the average household size of 9.4 members in 1996. The corresponding figure for 1999 is approximately Rs. 61,800, or US\$ 1,300. Consumption declined less than income did, indicating that households have *ex post* measures to cope with income risk (Kurosaki, forthcoming). The majority of the sample households are estimated to lie close to or below the poverty line (Kurosaki and Hussain, 1999; Kurosaki and Khan, 2001). The composition shares show that the earning from non-agricultural employment is the most important one, followed by self-employment in agriculture and self-employment in non-agriculture. Therefore, the average income per

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<sup>8</sup>There were 15 cases of females employed by others for non-farm work. Among them, 11 were hired casually (five in construction and six in unspecified works including domestic services) and four were hired regularly (three in low-paid jobs and one with monthly, moderate salary).

worker in non-farm self-employment is highest, followed by that in wage employment in non-agriculture. The average income per worker in agriculture, whether it is self-employment or a wage job, is much lower than those in non-agriculture, suggesting a job stratification with a substantial income disparity. Then what determines the job stratification among these four activities?

This paper attributes the answer to a difference in returns to human capital in rural economic activities. Information on age and educational achievement is shown in Table 3, for the same working males described in Table 2. The average age was 36.0 in 1996 and 34.6 in 1999. The educational achievement is shown in two different forms. Schooling years correspond to a standard variable in Mincerian models of economic returns to education.<sup>9</sup> To capture non-linear effects of education associated with educational stages, a series of dummy variables are also compiled, with no education as a reference group. Among these dummy variables, the average of the literacy dummies that correspond to primary school education or above is reported in Table 3. These numbers show that educational achievement of sample households is indeed low — the average schooling was 3.7 years in 1996 and 4.0 years in 1999; literacy rate was 43% in 1996 and 48% in 1999.<sup>10</sup>

The relationship between employment status and human capital variables is also summarized in Table 3. The self-employed are older than employees and those working in agriculture are older than those in non-agriculture. The difference in educational achievement is more significant between agricultural vs. non-agricultural jobs than between employment vs. self-employment — those engaged in non-agricultural jobs are generally more educated than those engaged in agricultural jobs.

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<sup>9</sup>To reflect the fact that repetition is common in the study area and skipping is also possible for bright students (Hoodbhoy, 1998; Sawada and Lokshin, 2001), years measured in Pakistan's standardized education system were used in converting completed grades into completed years of education. Up to the twelfth grade, the system is standardized as follows: *primary* education of five years beginning from the age of five or six, either by primary or mosque schools; *middle* education of three years; *secondary* education of two years; *higher secondary* education of two years. After completing the twelfth grade and passing the "intermediate" FA/FSc degree examination, degree classes are taught at universities and colleges with various years of instruction depending on the specialization (Hoodbhoy, 1998).

<sup>10</sup>Achievement in female education is much lower than that for males reported here. In 1996, average schooling was 0.5 years and the literacy rate was 7.6% for female counterparts (Kurosaki, 2001). As Sawada and Lokshin (2001) showed, the gender gap in education is more influenced by the gender gap in the initial enrollment into primary education. In our case also, the gender gap in the average schooling years becomes much smaller when only those who completed primary education are compared.

### 3 Empirical Specification

The descriptive analysis above suggests that rural non-agricultural activities are associated with higher earnings per worker and higher education levels of male workers involved. To investigate whether or not this association can be explained by a difference in returns to human capital, this section proposes empirical models that are comparable between the four rural activities and control for endogenous selection of the activities. Before presenting empirical specifications, a brief discussion on the theory would help in aligning the issue of labor allocation with that of returns to human capital.

#### 3.1 A Theoretical Model of Labor Allocation

We assume a unitary decision making process at the household level with respect to labor allocation, following the model by Newman and Gertler (1994). A risk-neutral household allocates labor from household members ( $i = 1, \dots, N$ ), from which it obtains disposable income  $y$ . From leisure enjoyed by household members, the household obtains utility  $v(l_1, l_2, \dots, l_N)$ , where  $v(\cdot)$  is a concave function, which is separable from utility from income  $y$ . This specification implicitly assumes that the household uses a two-stage decision making process with respect to consumption of non-leisure goods—in the first stage, it only allocates resources between household consumption and leisure; it allocates household consumption among members in the second stage based on the level of  $y$ . We treat  $y$  as a numéraire so that net returns to labor are denoted in real terms.

The household faces a budget constraint and  $N$  time constraints, one for each member. Each member can potentially enter into  $M$  economic activities, each of which yields a net return to labor  $f_j$ . More formally, the household's optimization is expressed as

$$\max_{L_{ij}} \quad y + v(l_1, l_2, \dots, l_N), \quad (1)$$

subject to the budget constraint

$$y_0 + \sum_{j=1}^M f_j(L_{1j}, L_{2j}, \dots, L_{Nj}; X_j) = y, \quad (2)$$

time constraints

$$\sum_{j=1}^M L_{ij} + l_i = T_i, \quad i = 1, \dots, N, \quad (3)$$

and non-negativity conditions for labor allocation variables ( $y_0$  is a non-labor income including the sum of returns to household assets,  $L_{ij}$  is hours of work by individual  $i$  in activity

$j$ , which is constrained as non-negative,  $X_j$  in constraint (2) is a vector of quasi-fixed enterprise input such as land, fixed capital, household human capital composition, etc., and  $T_i$  in constraint (3) is the time endowment for individual  $i$ ).

The first order conditions for the optimization consist of the following Kuhn-Tucker ( $M \times N$ ) equations

$$L_{ij} \geq 0, \quad \frac{\partial f_j}{\partial L_{ij}} - \frac{\partial v}{\partial l_i} \leq 0, \quad L_{ij} \left( \frac{\partial f_j}{\partial L_{ij}} - \frac{\partial v}{\partial l_i} \right) = 0. \quad (4)$$

A sufficient condition for the Kuhn-Tucker conditions (4) when household member  $i$  works can be expressed as:

$$L_{ik} > 0 \quad \text{and} \quad L_{ij} = 0 \quad \text{if} \quad \frac{\partial f_k}{\partial L_{ik}} > \frac{\partial f_j}{\partial L_{ij}}, \quad \forall j \neq k. \quad (5)$$

These expressions show that the principle of household labor allocation is comparative advantages determined by the marginal returns to labor  $\partial f_j / \partial L_{ij}$ . For example, when a household member can earn more as a non-agricultural employee than in agricultural self-employment or than in household work, the household allocates him/her to the non-agricultural employment even if the absolute level of his/her marginal contribution to self-employed farming is higher than those of other household members. Although this property is derived from a unitary household model, equation (5) could be derived from a class of household models that belong to a Pareto-efficient bargaining models without uncertainty. Therefore, the empirical part of this paper focuses on the shape of  $\partial f_j / \partial L_{ij}$  as a function of human capital.

### 3.2 Introducing Risk Aversion

Agriculture is risky, especially crop farming in Village A, which is not irrigated. The average wheat output per acre was only 700kg/ha in Village A in 1996 and the coefficient of variation among farmers is also large at 67 to 81% (Kurosaki and Hussain, 1999, Table 7). Low average and high variability characterize rainfed agriculture. In the survey, we collected information on the household head's subjective assessment on adjustment to economic risk. From their responses, it was found that once households are hit by a bad luck, the majority of them have neither sufficient assets in monetary or in any liquid form nor access to formal credit markets; they therefore turn to reciprocal, informal credits among relatives and friends if they are fortunate enough to have such relations; otherwise, they simply cut their consumption (Kurosaki and Hussain, 1999, Table 13).

Considering the inherent income risk faced by the sample households and their limited access to formal insurance and credit markets, it is possible that households pay due attention to the riskiness of each economic activity when they allocate their labor force. The theoretical model of Section 3.1 in a simple static framework can be extended with risk aversion behavior.

We implicitly assume two seasons: in the first season, a household determines labor allocation among household members; in the second, it enjoys consumption based on the realized amount of returns to labor and other household assets. Household's *ex post* welfare is represented by a utility function  $v(l_1, l_2, \dots, l_N) + u(y)$ , where  $v(\cdot)$  is the same as before and  $u(\cdot)$  is now a strictly concave function of  $y$  (numéraire). Since  $l$  and  $y$  are consumed in different seasons, separability is assumed.

The household maximizes the expected utility, i.e.,  $v(l_1, l_2, \dots, l_N) + E[u(y)]$ , with respect to  $L_{ij}$ , subject to the same constraints in equations (2), (3), and non-negativity conditions. The first order conditions then become

$$L_{ij} \geq 0, \quad E[u'(y) \frac{\partial f_j}{\partial L_{ij}}] - \frac{\partial v}{\partial l_i} \leq 0, \quad L_{ij} \left( E[u'(y) \frac{\partial f_j}{\partial L_{ij}}] - \frac{\partial v}{\partial l_i} \right) = 0. \quad (6)$$

To investigate the effects of risk and risk aversion on labor force allocation, we approximate  $u'(y)$  by its first-order Taylor expansion (Kurosaki and Fafchamps, 2002):

$$u'(y) \approx u'(E[y]) + u''(E[y])(y - E[y]) = u'(E[y]) [1 - R(y - E[y])/E[y]], \quad (7)$$

where  $R$  is an Arrow-Pratt coefficient of relative risk aversion evaluated at  $E[y]$ . Inserting the above approximation into the first order condition in (6), we obtain its sufficient condition corresponding to equation (5) as

$$L_{ik} > 0 \quad \text{and} \quad L_{ij} = 0 \quad \text{if} \\ E \left[ \frac{\partial f_k}{\partial L_{ik}} \right] - \frac{R_h}{E[y_h]} Cov \left( \frac{\partial f_k}{\partial L_{ik}}, y_h \right) > E \left[ \frac{\partial f_j}{\partial L_{ij}} \right] - \frac{R_h}{E[y_h]} Cov \left( \frac{\partial f_j}{\partial L_{ij}}, y_h \right), \quad \forall j \neq k, \quad (8)$$

where  $Cov(x, y)$  denotes the covariance between  $x$  and  $y$ .

Equation (8) implies that the household decision price for labor allocation is now the sum of marginal returns to labor and a discount for the riskiness of each activity. For example, suppose a case when activity 1 is the least profitable on average among the four but is associated with the lowest income risk. If this is the case, the household would allocate its labor force to activity 1 when the household is sufficiently risk-averse (sufficiently high  $R$ ) or other activities are sufficiently risky. Unlike equation (5), equation (8) might not be applicable to Pareto-efficient bargaining models under risk, because  $R$ 's of such models

are likely to vary for each individual, reflecting individual members' risk preferences and bargaining rules.

One caveat is that equation (8) is much stronger than equation (6). With risk aversion and non-linearity in marginal returns to labor in self-employment, it is likely that the same individual is allocated to multiple activities, when returns to these activities are negatively correlated. The issue of multiple jobs at the individual level is worth further study.

### 3.3 An Empirical Model of Labor Allocation

As shown above, efficient allocation of household labor force requires that the factor be allocated based on a comparative advantage principle. For example if the household's objective is to maximize expected income, when a household member can earn more as a non-farm employee than in other activities, he/she is allocated to the non-farm employment even he/she is a better farmer than other household members. If the household's objective is to maximize expected utility incorporating labor-leisure choice and risk aversion, the comparative advantage should be adjusted based on subjective equilibrium prices, which could diverge from the market returns to labor of each family member. Explanatory variables for a reduced-form function of the optimal labor allocation thus include household and individual attributes determining marginal productivity of the labor force and the household's consumption and risk preferences.

With additional assumption that the household utility associated with allocating individual  $i$  to activity  $j$  has a non-stochastic component and a stochastic term with extreme-value distribution, the labor allocation can be characterized by a multinomial logit model (McFadden, 1974). We specify the multinomial logit model as

$$Prob(z_{it} = j) = \frac{\exp(X_{it}\gamma_{j1} + X_{ht}\gamma_{j2})}{\sum_{k=0,1,2,3,4} \exp(X_{it}\gamma_{k1} + X_{ht}\gamma_{k2})}, \quad j = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, \quad (9)$$

and estimate it in the first stage of our empirical analysis, where  $z_{it}$  is an indicator variable denoting the choice for individual  $i$  in household  $h$  with respect to  $j$  in year  $t$ ,  $X_{it}$  is a vector of individual attributes such as education and age,  $X_{ht}$  is a vector of household attributes such as household wealth and production assets, and  $\gamma_{j1}$  and  $\gamma_{j2}$  are vectors of coefficients to be estimated, associated with choice  $j$  (household work = 0, non-agricultural wage employee = 1, agricultural wage employee = 2, non-agricultural self-employed = 3, and agricultural self-employed = 4).<sup>11</sup>

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<sup>11</sup>Another approach is to model sequential decision making in which the household allocates its member  $i$

The multinomial logit model can be estimated by a maximum likelihood method. Then, the fitted probability of individual  $i$  working in activity  $j$ ,  $Pr\hat{o}b(z_{it} = j)$  is given by expression (9) with  $\gamma_{j1}$  and  $\gamma_{j2}$  replaced by their estimates  $\hat{\gamma}_{j1}$  and  $\hat{\gamma}_{j2}$ . Similarly, the fitted probability of household  $h$  with its member(s) working in activity  $j$  is given by

$$Pr\hat{o}b(z_{ht} = j) = 1 - \prod_{i \in h} \frac{\sum_{k \neq j} \exp(X_{it}\hat{\gamma}_{k1} + X_{ht}\hat{\gamma}_{k2})}{\sum_k \exp(X_{it}\hat{\gamma}_{k1} + X_{ht}\hat{\gamma}_{k2})}. \quad (10)$$

These fitted values are used to calculate selection terms in the second-stage estimation explained below.

### 3.4 Determinants of Wage

Assuming wage labor markets to be exogenous to household decisions, the unit wage becomes a function of the human capital of the employee,  $X_{it}$ . To capture this idea, a standard Mincer equation is estimated in which  $\ln W_{ijt}$  is regressed on  $X_{it}$ , where  $W_{ijt}$  is the wage level of individual  $i$  working in activity  $j$  ( $=1, 2$ ), in year  $t$ .

Two econometric issues are addressed in this paper. The first is sample selection. Because  $W_{ijt}$  is observed only when individual  $i$  works in  $j = 1$  or  $2$ , an error term to the Mincer equation conditional on this selection has non-zero mean. To control for this, a two-stage procedure is adopted in which a correction term  $\hat{\lambda}_{ijt}$  compiled from estimation results of equation (9) is added as an additional regressor.<sup>12</sup> Assuming that the error term to the wage equation is distributed normally, we adopt the correction term based on the general transformation of error terms to normality (Lee, 1983), because it facilitates a feasible computation of a selection term for the household-level regression in the next subsection. The correction term is defined as  $\hat{\lambda}_{ijt} \equiv \frac{\phi[\Phi^{-1}[Pr\hat{o}b(z_{it}=j)]]}{Pr\hat{o}b(z_{it}=j)}$ , where  $\phi[\cdot]$  and  $\Phi[\cdot]$  are density and distribution functions for a standard normal variable and  $Pr\hat{o}b(z_{it} = j)$  is obtained from the first-stage multinomial logit model. If at least one variable in  $X_h$  in (9) does not affect wages directly but affects it indirectly through the activity choice, the second-stage wage regression is identified.

Another econometric issue is unobserved characteristics that affect wages received by those who work in the wage sector. An example is worker's ability that is known to the

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to the wage sector versus the self-employment sector in the first stage and then allocates him to agriculture or non-agriculture in the second stage conditional on the choice made in the first stage. The first-stage choice can be modeled in a multinomial probit framework as well, in which the axiom of independence of irrelevant alternatives can be relaxed. Relaxing the assumption that the choices are exclusive is also worth exploring, since several individuals have secondary jobs as well (see note 2 of Table 2). Robustness of our results with respect to these approaches is left for a future investigation.

<sup>12</sup>This procedure enables us to obtain consistent estimates, although they are not fully efficient.

household but not observable to the econometrician. To minimize the bias from omitting these unobservable variables, a household specific effect,  $\alpha_h$ , is added to the wage regression. With household panel data, we can control for  $\alpha_h$  by either fixed or random effect specification. Since the fixed effect specification may exaggerate measurement error problems, we adopt the random effect specification as long as Hausman test cannot reject at 1% level the null hypothesis that  $X_i$  and  $\alpha_h$  are uncorrelated.

The wage function is thus specified as

$$\ln W_{ijt} = X_{it}\beta_j + \rho_j\hat{\lambda}_{ijt} + \alpha_{hj} + \epsilon_{ijt}, \quad j = 1, 2, \quad (11)$$

where  $\beta_j$  is a vector of coefficients to be estimated, which represents returns to human capital for an activity  $j$ ,  $\rho_j$  controls for the selectivity bias, and  $\epsilon_{ijt}$  is a zero mean random error term. Household specific effects  $\alpha_{hj}$  also control for the possibility of segmented labor markets.

For estimation, two sets of educational achievement variables are available (Section 2) — schooling years and a series of dummy variables for educational stages. When  $X_{i,edu}$  is the number of schooling years, the coefficient  $\beta_{j,edu}$  can be readily interpreted as a Mincerian rate of returns to schooling. When the second set is used, coefficient estimates can be converted into a Mincerian rate by dividing by the standard years of schooling for each stage.

### 3.5 Productivity in Self-Employment Activities

Unlike wage work, marginal returns to labor are unobservable for self-employment activities. What can be readily observed is gross production value, value-added (gross production value minus costs of intermediate input), or net income (value-added minus non-family factor costs). We thus estimate production functions for value-added, as was adopted by Yang (1997).<sup>13</sup>

Let  $q_{hjt}$  denote the value-added from self-employment activity  $j$  ( $= 3, 4$ ) for household  $h$  in year  $t$ . A Cobb-Douglas production function is assumed with two primary factors of production — the total labor input by household  $h$  into activity  $j$ , denoted as  $L_{hjt}$ , and the total capital input (non-agriculture) or the total land input (agriculture) denoted by  $H_{hjt}$ . Each household is used as a unit of analysis and the natural log of value-added is used as a dependent variable.

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<sup>13</sup>Alternatively, we can estimate directly the system of Kuhn-Tucker equations that equate marginal returns to labor with marginal rates of substitution (Newman and Gertler, 1994). Since the interests of this paper are on the effects of education on returns to labor, a simpler approach of production functions is adopted, which allows an intuitive comparison among the four economic activities and with previous studies.

Three econometric issues are addressed in this paper. The first is sample selection. Because  $q_{hjt}$  is observed only when household  $h$  is involved in  $j = 3$  or  $4$ , an error term to the value-added equation conditional on this selection has non-zero mean. To control for this, Lee's (1983) general transformation of error terms to normality is adopted, as in the case of wage functions. Under the assumption of normality of the error terms to the value-added functions, the correction term is defined as  $\hat{\lambda}_{hjt} \equiv \frac{\phi[\Phi^{-1}[\text{Pr}(\hat{z}_{ht}=j)]]}{\text{Pr}(\hat{z}_{ht}=j)}$ , where  $\text{Pr}(\hat{z}_{ht} = j)$  is defined in equation (10).

The second econometric issue is a potential correlation between the error terms to the dependent variables on the one hand and right-hand-side variables on the other hand. The correlation could occur when the right-hand-side variables are endogenous to household decisions even in the short run. Another reason for the potential correlation is measurement errors. These two problems are likely to be serious for factor inputs, especially labor inputs. To control for these problems, instruments are used for factor inputs and some other right-hand-side variables.

The third issue is unobserved characteristics that affect the productivity of enterprises. In farm production, land quality might differ from farm to farm, about which precise information is lacking in our dataset. In both farm and non-farm enterprises, households could be heterogeneous with respect to managerial ability. To minimize the bias from omitting these unobservable variables, a household specific effect,  $\alpha_h$ , is added to the value-added functions.

Therefore, the empirical model for self-employment is specified as

$$\ln q_{hjt} = b_{j0} + b_{j1} \ln L_{hjt} + b_{j2} \ln H_{hjt} + X_{hjt}c_j + \rho_j \hat{\lambda}_{hjt} + \alpha_{hj} + \epsilon_{hjt}, \quad j = 3, 4, \quad (12)$$

where  $X_{hjt}$  is a vector of household  $h$ 's characteristics that affect productivity of activity  $j$ , such as household human capital (education, experience, etc.) and production/market environment, and  $\epsilon_{hjt}$  is an i.i.d. error term. Parameters to be estimated are  $b_0$ ,  $b_1$ ,  $b_2$ ,  $\rho$ , and vector  $c$ . Because many households have zero input of some types of labor differentiated by education and gender, these labor hours cannot be incorporated separately in a Cobb-Douglas framework. Therefore, it is assumed that labor inputs are perfectly substitutable but the additive weights are different by the types of labor, reflecting different productivity (Fafchamps and Quisumbing, 1999). Parameter vector  $c$  is expected to capture these effects.

Theoretically, there are several routes through which human capital may affect productivity. The first route is its effects on the efficiency of labor inputs. For example, a literate

laborer will be able to follow the instruction of a labor task more precisely. In other words, what matters to production is not the amount of hours of labor  $L_{hjt}$  but the amount adjusted for its quality. Second, the accumulation of human capital might improve overall technical efficiency in production. Third, the accumulation of human capital might improve allocative efficiency at the household level. For example, farms with higher human capital might be able to obtain a higher profit by allocating production factors more efficiently. This could occur either because a farm manager with higher human capital is more able to allocate resources in a way closer to what maximizes the expected profit, than a manager with lower human capital, or, because a farm household with higher human capital would behave in a less risk averse way thanks to its higher ability to cope with risk, even when both types of farms are equally able to adopt the expected profit maximizing plan. We can investigate whether or not the third factor is important by estimating agricultural value-added functions at different aggregation levels. If the effects of education on the farm-level value-added are larger than those on value-added of individual crops, the difference could be attributable to educated farmers' superiority in allocating factors across crops.

For estimation, several sets of educational variables are available. Possible choices include the maximum or minimum of education among all household members, the average (or median) of all household members, the average (or median) of those household members who work in the household self-employment business, the education level of the household head, and so on (Jolliffe, 2002; Yang, 1998). Because of the small sample size and high collinearity among these variables, simultaneous inclusion of these variables did not work well. Therefore, each of these choices was tried in the initial runs and the one that resulted in the best fit in terms of adjusted  $R^2$  is reported below.

## 4 Estimation Results

### 4.1 Determinants of Labor Allocation

Table 4 reports estimation results for the first-stage multinomial logit model (9). Variables in vector  $X_{it}$  (individual characteristics that affect his/her productivity and market wage) include age, age squared, and educational achievement dummies (Model A) or schooling years (Model B). Age and age squared are included to capture non-linear effects of experiences. The marginal effects of education dummies in Model A suggest a pattern with accelerating probability of joining non-farm wage markets at the cost of farm self-employment as the

education level goes up. This is confirmed by negative effects of the squared term of male schooling years on joining non-farm wage markets in Model B. Thus the probability of joining non-farm wage markets out of self-employment farming increases with education at an increasing rate. The effects of age show an inverted U shape for farm and non-farm wage employment and an U shape for farm self-employment.

The marginal effects of  $X_{ht}$  show that households with more adult male members and less dependent members are more likely to send their labor force to outside employment. Households with land assets are more likely to send their labor force to their own farms. These results imply that the necessity of family labor on family farms is an important determinant for the choice whether or not a household sends household members to non-agricultural wage jobs.

## 4.2 Effects of Human Capital on Non-Agricultural Wages

With the sample selection term obtained from the results above, the second-stage wage equation (11) is estimated for non-agricultural wage earners.<sup>14</sup> The dependent variable is natural log of average monthly wage from non-agricultural employment. In estimation, an intercept dummy for the second survey is added to control for macro shocks. Estimation results are shown in Table 5, based on a random effect specification. Although  $\chi^2$  statistics for Hausman test is somewhat large, it is not larger than the 1% significance level. Therefore, random effect estimation results are reported, which are likely to be more robust to measurement errors than fixed effect results.<sup>15</sup>

Estimation results show that there are significantly positive effects of education on the wage level. A worker with primary education is expected to be paid 17% ( $\approx e^{0.154} - 1$ ) higher than a non-literate worker (reference group); with middle school education, 31% higher; and

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<sup>14</sup> $X_{ht}$  in (9) serve as identifying variables for the selection term. We assume that household asset variables that are closely related with farming such as land holding do not directly affect wages paid by others for non-agricultural works but only indirectly through activity choices. Although it is possible that these variables may capture unobservable ability of individuals in implementing non-agricultural work so that they affect non-agricultural wages directly, our field observations suggest that this is unlikely. For example, the nutrition-based efficiency wage theory suggests that individuals from landed family are paid higher due to their superior nutrition conditions. This is unlikely among villagers in the study areas, since little difference was observed in calorie intake across land holding classes.

<sup>15</sup>The returns to schooling reported in this paper could be an overestimate for rates of return expected from education investment on a random basis, if more able children are selected by the parents or by the community to receive higher education (innate ability bias). The bias may not be large since we utilize panel information to control for household-level unobservables by  $\alpha_h$ . Furthermore, the consensus in the literature is that the upward ability bias may exist but is relatively small (Card, 1999), which is applicable to the case of Pakistan as well (Alderman et al., 1996; 2001).

with high and higher school education, 64% higher (Model A). These parameters imply the following Mincerian rates of returns: 3.1% for education up to the primary level, 3.4% for education up to the middle level, and 4.4% for education up to the secondary and higher level; or 3.9% for additional middle education after primary education and 5.8% for additional higher education after middle education. This range is consistent with the estimates in earlier studies on the returns to schooling in rural non-farm activities in Pakistan (Fafchamps and Quisumbing, 1999; Alderman et al., 1996). When the schooling year and its quadratic term are included as education variables (Model B), only the positive coefficient on the quadratic term is statistically significant. These results suggest a possibility that return to education increases with education at an increasing rate, which is consistent with results for labor market participation (Table 4).

Since non-farm wage employment is diverse, distinguishing various types with more disaggregation, e.g., by industries or by the size of establishments, could be important. Our samples do not have sufficient variation in the establishment size. Preliminary examination showed that wages were not different across industries but substantially different whether a person is hired casually or regularly. Therefore, we extended the model in (9) by distinguishing these two types of non-agricultural wage employment and re-estimated the Mincerian model in (11) separately for the two types. Since the difference of the coefficients was not statistically significant except for the intercept, we merged them with an employment type dummy. Estimation results are reported as Model C in Table 5. In effect, the coefficient on the dummy in Model C shows the treatment effect of working in regularly-hired activity with the endogenous selection controlled for. The dummy variable is significantly positive, indicating that wages for the regularly hired were on average 60% ( $\approx e^{0.474} - 1$ ) higher than those for the casually hired.<sup>16</sup> The coefficients on education in Model C are much smaller than those in Model A. This is because more educated individuals are more likely to work regularly. Education thus not only increases the wage in non-agriculture but also increases the probability of working in non-agricultural activities with higher and stable payment.

Among other human capital variables in vector  $X_i$ , age as a proxy for job experience shows an inverted U-shape, with both coefficients on linear and quadratic terms significant. Wage is maximized at the age range of 42 to 47 years, depending on the model. These

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<sup>16</sup>Some of this difference might be due to the difference in the intensity of employment in a month, although we corrected for the difference in working days by using daily earnings multiplied by the standard number of monthly working days for the casually-hired, not the observed monthly earnings.

results suggest that productivity in non-agricultural wage work responds positively with experience but at a diminishing rate. The selection term is significantly positive in all the models, indicating a positive selection. Individuals whose propensity to be employed in non-agriculture is high are expected to earn more even after controlling for the direct effects of their individual attributes on wages.

### 4.3 Effects of Human Capital on Agricultural Wages

Table 6 reports estimation results for agricultural wage earners. The dependent variable is natural log of average monthly wages from agricultural employment.

In sharp contrast to results in Table 5, only the coefficient on primary education dummy is significant with about 3.8% Mincerian returns (Mode A). Education higher than the primary level does not seem to contribute to higher agricultural wages. When both linear and quadratic terms of schooling years are included (Model B), both are significant with inverted U shape, implying that marginal returns to education becomes negative at more than five years of schooling (i.e., standard years of primary schooling in Pakistan). Age and age squared show an inverted U-shape but the coefficients are smaller than those for non-agricultural wages.

The non-response of farm wages to higher education is understandable considering the nature of the farm labor market in the study region. Most of these workers are hired for unskilled, manual work on the farm such as weeding, harvesting, transporting, etc. It is no wonder that job experiences or education do not contribute much to improvement in productivity of such works. The selection term is positive but not statistically significant.

### 4.4 Effects of Human Capital on Non-Farm Enterprise Productivity

Production function (12) is estimated for non-agricultural self-employment. The dependent variable is natural log of value-added from non-farm enterprises. Labor input is measured by the monetary sum of wages actually paid to hired workers and imputed wages for family workers using the same wages or village average wages imputed at daily basis. Capital input is defined as the total capital used in production, approximated by the machinery/equipment depreciation and land rents for the non-farm enterprise. Since the two factors of production, labor and capital, are determined endogenously by the household and they are also likely to suffer from measurement errors, they are replaced by their fitted values using other right-hand-side variables, the acreage of agricultural land owned by the household, the number

of adult males, the net value of household assets (transportation and durable consumption goods), and the value of livestock (both levels and logs) as instruments.

Two stage least squares random effect estimation results are reported in Table 7. The coefficients on both of the production factors are statistically significant. Elasticities of production with respect to the two production factors are estimated in a reasonable range, with their sum around 0.83, indicating slightly decreasing returns to scale in non-farm enterprises in the study area.

Regarding the effects of education variables, the average education among those household members who are engaged in the non-farm business performed marginally better than other specifications in terms of adjusted  $R^2$ . This could be due to the fact that the number of those engaged in non-farm business within a household is not large and they do not always include the household head and the individual with the highest education. The coefficients on educational stage dummies show significantly positive effects with higher reward for higher education (Model A). This is similar to the results for non-farm wages but the difference among educational stages is larger. When educational achievement dummies are replaced by schooling years, their coefficients are insignificant when both linear and quadratic terms are included but a model with a quadratic term only has a significantly positive coefficient and fits the data marginally better than a model with a linear term only (not reported). Coefficients on the age of the household head and its quadratic term show an U-shape, but only the quadratic term is significant in both models. This seems to suggest that experience is associated with an increasing return in managing non-farm enterprises. The coefficient on the sample selection term is close to zero and not statistically significant, suggesting that errors in labor allocation decisions and those in value-added functions are not strongly correlated.

Since non-farm enterprises are diverse, distinguishing various types of non-farm activities with more disaggregation, e.g., low-end type jobs like hawkers and high-end type jobs like wheat mill owners, could be important (Lanjouw, 1999; Lanjouw and Lanjouw, 2001). Considering the limited number of observations, a dummy variable for those self-employed activities that are carried out in a permanent business space (for example, shop space or workshop space) is included in Model B. Since the dummy variable could be endogenous, the selection term was re-estimated by extending the model in (9) by distinguishing these two types of non-agricultural self-employment. The dummy variable has a significantly positive coefficient, indicating that those enterprises with business spaces are likely to belong to the

high-end type jobs. The coefficients on education in Model B are much smaller than those in Model A. This implies that the education level of those household members working in non-farm enterprises and the type of business (low-end vs. high-end) are positively correlated. Therefore, education is associated not only with higher productivity in non-agricultural self-employment but also with higher probability of having high-end type enterprises.

#### 4.5 Effects of Human Capital on Farm Productivity

Finally, production function (12) is estimated for agricultural value-added either from wheat or from all crops combined. The first factor of production, labor, is calculated in a way similar to that of non-farm enterprises. The second factor of production is now a land input, measured by the wheat-cropped area or the total farm area. Wheat is the staple food in the region, grown with homogeneous production technology, except for the extent of irrigation. It is the crop cultivated by the majority of farmers.

The vector  $X_{hjt}$  in equation (12) includes those household characteristics that affect farm productivity, such as household human capital and production/market environment. Regarding the latter, the most important factor is irrigation. Therefore, irrigation ratio on the farm is included. In addition, the share of land under sharecropping arrangements, village dummies, and cross terms between them are tried. Sharecropping ratios are included to control for the productivity impacts of agrarian contracts (Hayami and Otsuka, 1993).

Table 8 gives 2SLS random effect estimation results for wheat value-added. In the 2SLS estimation, the two production factors and the sharecropping ratio are replaced by their fitted values. Identifying instrumental variables are the same as those used for non-farm enterprises.

The coefficients on both of the production factors are statistically significant but that on labor is much smaller than the case of non-farm business, indicating the paramount importance of land in farming. As expected, the effect of irrigation is significantly positive. Labor productivity in wheat production in a completely irrigated farm is close to three times the productivity in a completely rainfed farm ( $e^{1.076} \approx 2.93$ ). Unexpectedly, the sharecropping ratio in wheat cropped land has a positive effect. It is significant only in Village A, after deleting insignificant cross terms with village dummies. This seems to suggest that sharecropping contracts are associated with superior access to capital for tenant farmers through landlords in Village A, where financial institutions are the least developed (Kurosaki and Hussain, 1999). Another possibility is that due to low and unstable land productivity

in Village A, only those plots that are inherently more productive are rented out but the quality difference in land is unobservable to us and may not be controlled completely with household specific effects  $\alpha_h$ . In any case, the reason for the absence of disincentive effects of sharecropping on productivity could be attributable to low monitoring costs in the study region with close relationships between tenants and landlords (Kurosaki and Hussain, 1999). The coefficient on the sample selection term is not statistically significant.

Regarding the household education variables, the average education among those household members who are engaged in farming performed the best in terms of adjusted  $R^2$ .<sup>17</sup> In sharp contrast to results for non-farm enterprises, none of the coefficients on primary, middle, and high education are significant (Model A). Replacing these education variables by schooling years do not yield meaningful results (not reported). When the three education levels are merged into one variable of “literacy” dummy, its coefficient is still insignificant (Model B). Therefore, returns to schooling in wheat production are not discernible from our data.

Table 9 gives estimation results of the same model when it is applied to value-added from all the crops. The effects of irrigation and the cross term of sharecropping ratio and Village A dummy are stronger, suggesting that crops competing with wheat are more irrigation sensitive and capital intensive than wheat. Now two of the education dummies have significant coefficients with similar magnitudes (Model A). The null hypothesis that the coefficients on the three dummies are the same was not rejected at 10% level. Therefore, acceleration of returns to education is not observed in agricultural self-employment. Having additional years of education beyond the primary or middle levels does not seem to contribute to higher farm productivity in the study area. When the three stages are merged, the impact of the average literacy of family farm labor is statistically significant at 1% and its magnitude is much higher than the case for wheat (Model B).

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<sup>17</sup>The highest education levels among household members are not statistically significant in most of the cases (Kurosaki, 2001). Our finding is consistent with Jolliffe’s (2002) finding that, among several alternative measures of household education, the average among the household members is the best determinant of household productivity in Ghana. On the other hand, ours is in sharp contrast to Yang’s (1997, 1998) finding for Chinese farmers that the household maximum education matters the most in determining farm productivity. Yang (1997) argued that the more educated members of a Chinese farm household, even when they have non-farm jobs, can contribute to decision making on the farms, through which their education raises farm productivity. In our case, the more educated members of the household with non-agricultural jobs are usually indifferent to farm management. This could be due to three factors in the study region: (1) a strong preference for non-manual (i.e., non-agricultural) work, (2) a larger household size that enables educated family members to be specialized in non-farm activities, and (3) a relatively low share of agricultural income in the total household income.

When value-added functions were estimated for individual non-wheat crops, we were not able to obtain significant effects of education, possibly due to the small size of samples. When value-added functions were estimated for non-wheat crops combined, coefficients on education were similar to or smaller than those shown in Table 9. Our field observations also suggest that gains in efficiency units of labor or in technical efficiency due to education in each cultivation cycle are small, if any, and show little difference across crops. Therefore, we interpret that the larger coefficients on education at the farm level suggests that educated farmers are more able to allocate land efficiently among different crops.<sup>18</sup>

In sharp contrast to non-farm enterprises, the additional gain from education higher than the primary level is not large in farming. This is consistent with our findings for agricultural wages in Table 6. However, this contradicts the findings in the existing literature on technical efficiency in Pakistan's agriculture (Hussain, 1989; Ahmad et al., 2002), which argued that most of the progressive farmers adopting superior technology have education higher than the primary or middle levels. We interpret our results as showing that the main contribution of education to farm value-added comes from a more efficient crop choice. In order to be sensitive to market returns, a jump from no education to formal, primary education may matter more than a marginal gain from schooling above the primary or middle levels. In other words, farmers who have primary or higher education can behave in a more market-oriented way than those who have never attended schools.

The results, therefore, shed new light on the controversy on the effects of education on farm productivity (Lockheed et al., 1980; Jamison and Lau, 1982; Yang, 1998). First, its effects are likely to be non-linear. Our results suggest a possibility that in farm production, a jump from no education to literacy matters the most. If this is the case, applying a model that includes only a linear term of schooling years may result in the insignificance of education. Second, its effects are likely to differ at different levels of aggregating farm output. Our results suggest that at a higher level of aggregation, the effects of education can be depicted more distinctly, possibly due to the superiority of educated farmers in allocating factors efficiently.

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<sup>18</sup>See also results by Yang and An (2002), who found that schooling improved the efficiency in allocating quasi-fixed inputs across sectors within a farm household in China.

## 4.6 Job Stratification and Returns to Labor

An important finding from the previous subsections is the contrast between the response to higher education of farm returns and that of non-farm productivity — the farm returns are the most sensitive to the literacy whereas the non-farm labor markets remunerate higher education with a higher wage.<sup>19</sup> Because of this reason and the diminishing return to labor in self-employment on the farm, which is captured by a coefficient on the labor input significantly smaller than unity in Tables 8-9, we expect that more educated households have more diversified labor force, spanning a number of non-farm activities. Then how much can these differences in labor returns alone explain the observed allocation of labor force? To examine this question, this subsection simulates labor force allocation predicted by estimation results in Tables 5-9 but ignoring selection terms, instead of simulating labor force allocation based on the multinomial logit results.

In the simulation, we would like to allocate individual  $i$  in household  $h$  to sector  $j$  where his marginal labor return is the highest. As in Subsection 3.1, let  $f_{hj}(L_{ij})$  be his net-return-to-labor function. For wage sectors, we assume that  $\ln(\partial f_{hjt}/\partial L_{ijt}) = \ln W_{ijt}$ . Therefore, we calculate a fitted value or out-of-sample forecast value from estimation results of equation (11) for the simulation, namely,

$$\hat{\ln}(\partial f_{hjt}/\partial L_{ijt}) \equiv X_{it}\hat{\beta}_j, \quad j = 1, 2. \quad (13)$$

For self-employment, what we have estimated is  $\ln q_{hjt}$ , the value-added from household  $h$ 's activity  $j$ . Based on the approximation  $\partial f_{hjt}/\partial L_{ijt} \approx \partial q_{hjt}/\partial L_{hjt} = b_{j1}q_{hjt}/L_{hjt}$ , where  $b_{j1}$  is a coefficient on the log of labor in equation (12), we calculate

$$\hat{\ln}(\partial f_{hjt}/\partial L_{ijt}) \equiv \ln \hat{b}_{j1} + \hat{b}_{j0} + (\hat{b}_{j1} - 1) \ln L_{hjt} + \hat{b}_{j2} \ln H_{hjt} + X_{hjt}\hat{c}_j, \quad j = 3, 4, \quad \forall i \in h. \quad (14)$$

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<sup>19</sup>To examine the robustness of these results based on the selection correction formula by Lee (1983), different specifications were also attempted. For individual-level wage equations, the selection term suggested by Dubin and McFadden (1984), which does not require the assumption of normality of the error term to the wage equation, was also available. For household-level value-added equations, we estimated a household-level probit model in which the probability of having a (non-)farm enterprise is regressed on  $X_h$  and household-level averages of  $X_i$  used in model (9). An inverse Mills ratio estimated from this probit model replaced  $\hat{\lambda}_{hjt}$  in equation (12). The results based on these alternative specifications (available on request) were very close to those reported in Tables 5-9 in this paper. Farm production functions under different specifications yielded qualitatively the same results. For example, cross terms of education dummies and village dummies were also tried to investigate whether returns to higher education in farming are higher only in modernizing environments (Schultz, 1961), such as Village C in our data set. These cross terms were not significant. To investigate whether or not attrition seriously bias the estimation results reported in this paper, an inverse Mills ratio estimated from the probit model given in Appendix 2 was added to the household-level, value-added models in this paper using the sub-sample of households belonging to the balanced panel. It was found that the magnitudes and significance of coefficients did not change, and the coefficient on the inverse Mills ratio was not significant either, suggesting that the attrition bias may not be serious.

This value is calculated only for those individuals belonging to a household, where  $L_{hjt}$ ,  $H_{hjt}$ , and  $X_{hjt}$  are available, i.e., a household with self-employment activities.

We thereby obtain  $\hat{\ln}(\partial f_{jt}/\partial L_{ijt})$ , for each individual  $i$  in year  $t$ , where  $j = 1$  (non-agricultural wage), 2 (agricultural wage), 3 (self-employment in non-agriculture), and 4 (self-employment in agriculture).<sup>20</sup> Then each individual is assigned a “predicted” job whose  $\hat{\ln}(\partial f_{jt}/\partial L_{ijt})$  is the highest among the four activities (or three or two, depending on the household). This exercise corresponds to the theoretical model of labor allocation given in Subsection 3.1. In other words, factors other than marginal labor productivity, such as risk aversion (Subsection 3.2), are assumed away.

Predicted patterns of labor allocation are summarized in Table 10. Diagonal cells show the number of correctly predicted individuals. Off-diagonal numbers correspond to those individuals with wrong prediction. Among 1,612 males engaged in one of the four sectors as a primary job, 896 or 55.6% are predicted correctly, which is a reasonably high percentage as a whole, considering that a substantial part of the information included in household attributes  $X_{th}$  used in estimating the multinomial logit model (9) is ignored. The multinomial logit results in Table 4 predict labor allocation correctly for 990 or 61.4% of the same individuals. The relatively-good performance of the simulation in Table 10 implies that difference in individuals’ productivity due to different education levels underlies the job stratification with a substantial income disparity.

What will happen to the static picture of job stratification in the long run? If the schooling decision by the sample households is solely based on an investment criterion and the credit and insurance markets are perfect, children’s schooling should be independent of households’ wealth. Only when innate ability is transferred from parents to children, we expect positive correlation between parents’ education and children’s education. However, credit and insurance markets in the study region are very incomplete (Kurosaki, forthcoming; Kurosaki and Khan, 2001). In the study villages, very few villagers use formal financial institutions, informal moneylenders are not available, and a tradition to borrow money with explicit interest rates in order to run a small scale business is missing. Reciprocal lending/borrowing is common but its ability to fund large investment is very limited. As a result of these credit constraints, parents’ education and physical assets are positively correlated

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<sup>20</sup>In simulation, parameter estimates from Model A in Tables 5-7 and 9 using educational stage dummies were used. For non-farm wages and non-farm enterprises, the specification without employment/business type was used because we are interested in capturing the full effect of education. Simulation results were qualitatively the same when models using schooling years were chosen.

with children's enrollment into schools.<sup>21</sup> Thus, the stratification is likely to be re-produced over generations under the market conditions prevailing in the study region.

Predictions regarding agricultural wage jobs are less precise though. This could be attributable to a social stigma associated with agricultural wage employment as a primary job. In the study region, full time farm laborers are found only among those households belonging to the lowest social rank. Incorrect prediction for several individuals in Table 10 could also be attributable to household risk aversion. Agriculture is risky, especially crop farming in Village A, which is not irrigated (Kurosaki, forthcoming; Kurosaki and Hussain, 1999).

## 5 Conclusions

This paper investigated the effects of human capital on farm and non-farm productivity using micro panel data of rural households in NWFP, Pakistan, where a substantial job stratification is observed in terms of income and education. To clarify the mechanism underlying this stratification, the human capital effects are estimated both for wages (individual level) and for self-employed activities (household level) on the one hand and both for farm and non-farm sectors on the other hand.

Estimation results of returns-to-labor regression models can be summarized as follows. First, private returns to education are significantly positive in non-farm wages for males, which increase with education at an increasing rate. Second, the effects of human capital are weak on agricultural wages. Third, the effects of education on non-farm enterprise productivity are positive with acceleration in reward as in the case for non-agricultural wages. Fourth, the effects of primary education on crop productivity are positive but the additional gain from higher education is small. Fifth, the effects of education on crop productivity are more significant at more aggregate levels in farm production, possibly reflecting the efficiency in factor allocation by educated farmers. The non-linearity and aggregation issues regarding the effects of education could be one of the reasons for the mixed results in the existing literature on the effects of education on farm productivity in developing countries.

These results thus show a clear contrast between farm and non-farm sectors — wages and productivity in non-farm activities rise with education at an increasing rate, whereas

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<sup>21</sup>Preliminary results of regressing enrollment on household attributes revealed that an increase of owned land by the mean size increases the primary enrollment ratio at the household level by 21% (statistically significant at 5%) and an increase of household head's education by a year increases the enrollment ratio by 2% (statistically significant at 1%). These results are available on request.

those in agriculture respond only to the primary education. They imply that more educated household members have comparative advantages in non-farming, which was confirmed by comparing observed labor force allocation with simulated labor force allocation predicted by the difference in labor returns. In other words, the difference in individuals' comparative advantages due to different education levels underlies the job stratification, which is likely to be re-produced over generations under imperfect credit markets in the study region.

The findings of this paper could justify a policy to give high priority to primary education in rural Pakistan, because the provision of quality primary education has efficiency enhancing effects on various rural activities. Since the private returns to higher education are sufficiently high for males in non-farm sectors, the priority of public intervention into those levels might be lower than the case for primary education.

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**Table 1: Sample Villages and Sample Households (NWFP, Pakistan)**

	Village A	Village B	Village C
Characteristics of the Sample Villages			
Irrigation	Rainfed	Rainfed/ Irrigated	Irrigated
Distance to main roads	10km	4km	1km
Population (1998 Census)	2,858	3,831	7,575
Number of households (1998 Census)	293	420	1,004
Adult literacy rates (% , 1998 Census)	25.8	19.9	37.5
Number of the Sample Households (1996)			
Total	119	116	120
Non-farm households	38	40	41
Farm households, total	81	76	79
Owner farm households	48	38	39
Owner-cum-tenant farm households	17	18	16
Pure tenant farm households	16	20	24
Number of the Sample Households (1999)			
Total	117	115	120
Replacement sample households	26	4	13
Resurveyed households	91	111	107
Complete and comparable panel hhs.	83	111	105
Divided households	8	0	0
Households with incomplete information	0	0	2
Characteristics of the complete and comparable panel households			
Average household size in 1996	10.7	8.4	9.0
Average household size in 1999	11.1	7.9	9.3
Average landholding size in 1996 (ha)	2.23	0.52	0.58
Average landholding size in 1999 (ha)	2.26	0.52	0.60
Average per-capita income, 1996 (\$)	194	231	337
Average per-capita income, 1999 (\$)	148	165	212
Average per-capita consumption, 1996 (\$)	134	157	201
Average per-capita consumption, 1999 (\$)	133	143	198

Notes: (1) “Average landholding size is the average over the total of complete panel including landless households.

(2) “Average per-capita income (consumption)” is the average over individuals included in the complete panel and its unit is US \$ in nominal values.

**Table 2: Labor Force Allocation and Household Income**

A. Distribution of Working Household Members by Employment Status and Sector					
	Household work	Employee		Self-Employed	
		Non-ag.	Agri.	Non-ag.	Agri.
1996 Survey					
Males	13	383	58	78	284
Females	762	6	0	3	4
1999 Survey					
Males	10	459	25	125	200
Females	774	9	0	1	3

  

B. Level and Composition of Household Income Excluding Transfers and Remittances					
	Mean level of household income #	Composition Share (%)			
		Employee		Self-Employed	
		Non-ag.	Agri.	Non-ag.	Agri.
1996 Survey					
All sample households	70,468	41.41	6.01	25.01	27.57
Non-farm households	58,839	49.33	9.37	33.83	7.48
Owner farm households	81,986	35.36	2.38	22.33	39.93
Owner-cum-tenant farm hh.	75,346	38.44	4.12	23.09	34.35
Pure tenant farm hh.	65,389	45.98	11.37	18.14	24.52
1999 Survey					
All sample households	61,796	40.43	4.22	26.52	28.83
Non-farm households	50,120	59.49	6.08	26.55	7.88
Owner farm households	72,527	31.83	1.78	29.64	36.74
Owner-cum-tenant farm hh.	84,513	20.17	2.96	28.04	48.84
Pure tenant farm hh.	53,548	40.69	7.94	15.49	35.88

Notes:

# Mean of the sum of the four sources of household income is shown. It is denoted in nominal Pakistan Rupees (US\$ 1.00 = Rs. 33.57 during the 1996 survey's reference period and 46.79 during the 1999 survey's reference period).

(1) The sample for Panel A of this table is those household members who are working (including household work) and whose age is 15 years and above.

(2) Employment status in Panel A was accorded to each worker based on his/her primary jobs. Approximately 12% of these workers reported their secondary jobs in 1996.

(3) Household income is defined as the sum of the income from self-employed activities, wage/salary/allowances from employed household members, net transfer receipt (public and private), net remittances receipt, and other unearned income. The numbers reported in this table cover only the first two categories. The sum of the last three categories is equivalent to 11.9% (1996) and 21.6% (1999) of the total reported in this table.

(4) The income of self-employed activities in agriculture includes the value of farm produce consumed by the same household. In other words, they are defined as the sum of gross values of total farm produce minus the sum of actually-paid expenses (intermediate goods, hired labor, hired machinery, hired capital, and rented land). Since livestock production is an important secondary job for all categories of households, the percentage of self-employed agricultural income is positive even for non-farm households. Since landlords in the study region usually take part in the farm management of tenants, land rent income is also included in self-employed agricultural income.

**Table 3: Human Capital Characteristics of Working Males**

	Total	Employee		Self-Employed	
		Non-ag.	Agri.	Non-ag.	Agri.
1996 Survey					
Mean age	35.99	31.25	38.02	33.64	42.52
Mean schooling years	3.68	4.94	1.90	4.28	2.19
Literacy rates (%)	42.9	53.8	25.9	51.3	29.2
1999 Survey					
Mean age	34.55	31.04	31.76	34.78	43.05
Mean schooling years	4.04	4.69	1.96	4.44	2.72
Literacy rates (%)	47.7	53.1	28.0	52.8	37.0

Notes:

- (1) The sample is the male subset shown in Table 2.
- (2) "Schooling years" are measured in standardized years, in which each level of completed education is allocated a single number of years corresponding to the standard education system in Pakistan.
- (3) For the total working males, age is distributed between 15 and 80 with standard deviation (s.d.) 15.11 in 1996; between 15 and 83 with s.d. 15.12 in 1999. Schooling year is distributed between 0 and 16 with s.d. 4.63 in 1996; between 0 and 16 with s.d. 4.67 in 1999.

**Table 4: Estimation Results of the Multinomial Logit Model**  
(Model A: Using Educational Stage)

	Marginal effects on the probability of choosing $j$ :				
	$j = 0$ (household work)	$j = 1$ (non-farm wage)	$j = 2$ (farm wage)	$j = 3$ (non-farm self-emp.)	$j = 4$ (farm self-emp.)
Intercept	-0.011	0.499	-0.185	-0.149	-0.154
Human capital variables					
D_primary	-0.018	0.014	-0.006	0.041	-0.031
D_middle	-0.021	0.077	-0.017	0.061	-0.101
D_high	-0.057	0.323	-0.059	0.021	-0.228
Age	-0.002	0.002	0.003	0.000	-0.003
Age <sup>2</sup> /100	0.002	-0.011	-0.003	0.000	0.012
Household asset variables					
Adult males #	0.011	0.028	0.026	-0.023	-0.042
Hh size #	-0.006	-0.009	-0.009	0.034	-0.011
D_land	0.001	-0.176	-0.039	-0.008	0.221
Land size #	0.007	0.079	-0.136	0.000	0.049
AssetsV&E #	0.003	0.012	-0.005	0.000	-0.010
Livestock #	0.005	-0.047	-0.018	-0.025	0.085
Village fixed effects					
Village B	0.008	-0.152	0.057	0.064	0.024
Village C	0.017	-0.225	0.065	0.062	0.080
Log-likelihood	-1620.33				
<i>LR</i> statistics for zero slope	593.14				

Notes:

- (1) Variables with # are standardized as  $(X - \text{mean})/\text{standard deviation}$ .
- (2) Only those explanatory variables whose  $\gamma_j$  is statistically significant at least 10% for some  $j$  are included. Full regression results including individual parameter estimates of  $\gamma_j$  on  $X_i$  and  $X_h$  and its standard errors are available on request.
- (3) *LR* statistics for zero slope is statistically significant at 1% level both for Model A and Model B.
- (4) The sample is the male subset shown in Table 2. Therefore, the number of observations is 1,635.
- (5) See Appendix 1 for the definition of regression variables.

**Table 4: Estimation Results of the Multinomial Logit Model (continued)**  
 (Model B: Using Schooling Years)

	Marginal effects on the probability of choosing $j$ :				
	$j = 0$ (household work)	$j = 1$ (non-farm wage)	$j = 2$ (farm wage)	$j = 3$ (non-farm self-emp.)	$j = 4$ (farm self-emp.)
Intercept	-0.012	0.511	-0.187	-0.145	-0.166
Human capital variables					
Schooling	0.001	-0.016	0.005	0.006	0.004
Schooling <sup>2</sup>	-0.001	0.004	-0.001	0.000	-0.002
Age	-0.002	0.002	0.003	0.000	-0.003
Age <sup>2</sup> /100	0.002	-0.010	-0.003	0.000	0.011
Household asset variables					
Adult males #	0.012	0.025	0.026	-0.024	-0.040
Hh size #	-0.006	-0.008	-0.009	0.034	-0.010
D_land	0.001	-0.176	-0.038	-0.007	0.221
Land size #	0.008	0.073	-0.132	-0.001	0.051
AssetsV&E #	0.003	0.012	-0.005	0.000	-0.010
Livestock #	0.005	-0.051	-0.018	-0.023	0.087
Village fixed effects					
Village B	0.009	-0.158	0.057	0.063	0.028
Village C	0.019	-0.231	0.067	0.061	0.084
Log-likelihood	-1617.61				
<i>LR</i> statistics for zero slope	598.57				

**Table 5: Estimation Results of the Non-Agricultural Wage Equation for Males**

	Model A: Using edu- cational stage			Model B: Using school- ing year			Model C: With employ- ment type		
	Coeff.	t-stat		Coeff.	t-stat		Coeff.	t-stat	
Intercept	6.002	32.510	***	6.097	33.659	***	6.239	30.658	***
Dummy for 1999	-0.271	-7.137	***	-0.273	-7.178	***	-0.310	-5.911	***
Human capital variables									
D_primary	0.154	2.334	**				0.107	1.686	*
D_middle	0.268	4.018	***				0.189	2.973	***
D_high	0.494	6.629	***				0.299	4.993	***
Schooling				0.0182	1.362				
Schooling <sup>2</sup>				0.0021	1.826	*			
Age	0.068	8.364	***	0.065	8.068	***	0.059	7.649	***
Age <sup>2</sup> /100	-0.081	-7.276	***	-0.077	-6.942	***	-0.063	-6.162	***
Employment type									
DPermanent							0.474	8.570	***
Selection correction term	0.528	3.919	***	0.451	3.433	***	0.211	1.801	*
$\bar{R}^2$		0.236			0.244			0.327	
$\bar{R}^2$		0.230			0.238			0.320	
Hausman test statistics	$\chi^2(7)$	11.51		$\chi^2(6)$	8.31		$\chi^2(8)$	13.55	

Notes: (1) \*\*\* significant at 1%, \*\* at 5%, \* at 10% (two-sided test).

(2) Estimated by an unbalanced panel method with random household effects.

(3) The sample is the subset of the male household members described in Table 2, who work in the non-agricultural sector as employees. One sample is deleted since its wage information is incomplete. Therefore, the number of observations is 841.

(4) The dependent variable is natural log of Non-ag. wage. See Appendix 1 for the definition of regression variables.

**Table 6: Estimation Results of the Agricultural Wage Equation for Males**

	Model A:			Model B:		
	Using educational stage			Using schooling year		
	Coeff.	t-stat		Coeff.	t-stat	
Intercept	6.700	16.229	***	6.656	16.142	***
Dummy for 1999	-0.325	-3.394	***	-0.330	-3.471	***
Human capital variables						
D_primary	0.185	2.638	***			
D_middle	0.017	0.200				
D_high	0.090	0.526				
Schooling				0.0679	2.420	**
Schooling <sup>2</sup>				-0.0073	-2.141	**
Age	0.026	2.707	***	0.028	2.858	***
Age <sup>2</sup> /100	-0.031	-2.782	***	-0.033	-2.913	***
Selection correction term	0.152	1.074		0.166	1.181	
$\bar{R}^2$	0.297			0.292		
$\bar{R}^2$	0.232			0.236		
Hausman test statistics	$\chi^2(7)$	10.23		$\chi^2(6)$	10.68	

Notes: (1), (2) see Table 5.

(3) The sample is the subset of the male household members described in Table 2, who work in the agricultural sector as employees. Therefore, the number of observations is 83.

(4) The dependent variable is natural log of Agri. wage. See Appendix 1 for the definition of regression variables.

**Table 7: Estimation Results of the Non-Farm Enterprises Production Model**

	Model A:			Model B:		
	Without business type			With business type		
	Coeff.	t-stat		Coeff.	t-stat	
Intercept	3.150	3.990	***	3.245	4.168	***
Dummy for 1999	-0.238	-0.928		-0.119	-0.458	
Basic production factors						
log of Labor_N	0.708	11.322	***	0.688	11.029	***
log of Capital_N	0.127	4.463	***	0.136	4.777	***
Human capital variables						
Education of family labor in the household business						
Sn_primary	0.100	0.812		0.044	0.352	
Sn_middle	0.328	2.465	**	0.284	2.141	**
Sn_high	0.558	4.132	***	0.452	3.212	***
Household experience						
Head's age	-0.029	-1.612		-0.032	-1.827	*
(Head's age) <sup>2</sup> /100	0.031	1.798	*	0.034	2.030	**
Business type						
D_busi.space				0.211	2.275	**
Selection correction term	-0.006	-0.063		-0.009	-0.090	
$\bar{R}^2$	0.635			0.648		
$\bar{R}^2$	0.614			0.626		
Hausman test statistics	$\chi^2(9)$	12.17		$\chi^2(10)$	12.36	

Notes: (1) see Table 5.

(2) Dependent variable is natural log of Q\_N (value-added of non-farm enterprise). NOB=170. See Appendix 1 for definition of variables.

(3) Estimated by a 2SLS unbalanced panel method with random household effects. Basic factors are replaced by their fitted values using other right-hand-side variables, the acreage of agricultural land owned by the household, the number of adult males, the net value of household assets (transportation and durable consumption goods), and the value of livestock (both levels and logs) as instruments.

**Table 8: Estimation Results of Wheat Production Model**

	Model A:			Model B:		
	Using educational stage			Using literacy		
	Coeff.	t-stat		Coeff.	t-stat	
Intercept	5.462	10.469	***	5.469	10.492	***
Dummy for 1999	0.098	0.736		0.099	0.748	
Basic production factors						
log of Labor_W	0.261	3.845	***	0.261	3.846	***
log of Land_W	0.598	7.734	***	0.597	7.730	***
Human capital variables						
Education of family farm labor						
Sf_primary	0.112	0.909				
Sf_middle	0.080	0.515				
Sf_high	0.133	0.973				
Sf_literacy				0.111	1.216	
Household experience						
Head's age	0.003	0.273		0.003	0.252	
(Head's age) <sup>2</sup> /100	-0.003	-0.224		-0.002	-0.200	
Control variables for production						
Irrigation	1.076	9.161	***	1.072	9.181	***
SC_W * (Village A Dummy)	0.430	3.304	***	0.429	3.308	***
Selection correction term	-0.003	-0.042		-0.002	-0.020	
$\bar{R}^2$	0.489			0.488		
$\bar{R}^2$	0.470			0.474		
Hausman test statistics	$\chi^2(11)$	7.86		$\chi^2(9)$	8.11	

Notes: (1) see Table 5.

(2) Dependent variable is log of Q.W (wheat value-added). NOB=323. See Appendix 1 for the definition of variables.

(3) Estimated by a 2SLS unbalanced panel method with random household effects. Basic factors and SC\_W are replaced by their fitted values using instrument variables listed in note (3) of Table 7.

**Table 9: Estimation Results of Crop Production Model**

	Model A:			Model B:		
	Using educational stage			Using literacy		
	Coeff.	t-stat		Coeff.	t-stat	
Intercept	5.712	12.746	***	5.713	12.776	***
Dummy for 1999	0.014	0.200		0.010	0.143	
Basic production factors						
log of Labor_F	0.276	6.417	***	0.277	6.472	***
log of Land_F	0.498	9.955	***	0.499	10.042	***
Human capital variables						
Education of family farm labor						
Sf_primary	0.201	1.565				
Sf_middle	0.299	1.886	*			
Sf_high	0.289	2.151	**			
Sf_literacy				0.256	2.837	***
Household experience						
Head's age	0.002	0.171		0.002	0.133	
(Head's age) <sup>2</sup> /100	-0.006	-0.543		-0.006	-0.508	
Control variables for production						
Irrigation	1.809	13.658	***	1.813	13.796	***
SC_F * (Village A Dummy)	0.522	3.347	***	0.517	3.327	***
Selection correction term	-0.128	-1.505		-0.127	-1.491	
$\bar{R}^2$	0.601			0.601		
$\tilde{R}^2$	0.590			0.592		
Hausman test statistics	$\chi^2(11)$	10.73		$\chi^2(9)$	10.69	

Notes: (1) see Table 5.

(2) Dependent variable is log of Q-F (value-added from all crops combined). NOB=413. See Appendix 1 for the definition of variables.

(3) Estimated by a 2SLS unbalanced panel method with random household effects. Basic factors and SC\_F are replaced by their fitted values using instrument variables listed in note (3) of Table 7.

**Table 10: Observed and Simulated Labor Allocation**

Observed labor force allocation	Simulated labor force allocation				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	Total
1996 Survey					
(1) Non-agricultural wage	<b>203</b>	37	62	81	383
(2) Agricultural wage	35	<b>6</b>	8	9	58
(3) Non-agricultural self-employment	1	0	<b>77</b>	0	78
(4) Agricultural self-employment	74	16	44	<b>150</b>	284
Total	313	59	191	240	803
1999 Survey					
(1) Non-agricultural wage	<b>214</b>	12	88	145	459
(2) Agricultural wage	13	<b>2</b>	4	6	25
(3) Non-agricultural self-employment	6	0	<b>106</b>	13	125
(4) Agricultural self-employment	14	2	46	<b>138</b>	200
Total	247	16	244	302	809

Notes: Bold face figures show correct predictions.

## Appendix 1: Definitions and Statistics of Empirical Variables

Name	Definition
<b>A. Individual Level Variables for the Multinomial Logit and Wage Regression</b>	
D_primary	Dummy variable for those with education up to primary level
D_middle	Dummy variable for those with education up to middle level
D_high	Dummy variable for those with education up to high school or higher level
Schooling	Standardized years of completed education
Age	Age of the person
Non-ag. wage	Monthly non-agricultural wage or salary actually paid to a worker (1996 Rs.)
D_permanent	Dummy variable for those employed regularly in non-agriculture
Agri. wage	Monthly agricultural wage actually paid to a worker (1996 Rs.)
<b>B. Household Level Variables</b>	
<b>B.1. Applicable to All Households</b>	
Adult males	Number of male household members whose age is 15 or above
Hh size	Number of household members living together
D_land	Dummy variable for households owning land
Land size	Land owned by the household in jaribs (about 0.5 acre)
AssetsV&E	Value of transportation vehicles and electric appliances owned (1000 Rs.)
Livestock	Value of livestock owned by the household (1000 Rs.)
Head's age	Age of the household head
<b>B.2. Additional Variables for Non-Farm Enterprise Value-Added Models</b>	
Sn_primary	Share of persons whose education is up to primary level in those household members engaged in self-employed non-farm business
Sn_middle	Share of persons whose education is up to middle level in those household members engaged in self-employed non-farm business
Sn_high	Share of persons whose education is higher than middle level in those household members engaged in self-employed non-farm business
Q_N	Total annual value-added from non-farm enterprises (1996 Rs)
Labor_N	Total labor input evaluated at village wages (1996 Rs)
Capital_N	Total capital used in production approximated by the machinery/equipment depreciation and land rents (1996 Rs)
D_busi.space	Dummy variable for those with a permanent business space
<b>B.3. Additional Variables for Farm Value-Added Models</b>	
Sf_primary	Share of persons whose education is up to primary level in those household members engaged in self-employed agriculture
Sf_middle	Share of persons whose education is up to middle level in those household members engaged in self-employed agriculture
Sf_high	Share of persons whose education is higher than middle level in those household members engaged in self-employed agriculture
Sf_literacy	Share of literate persons in those household members engaged in self-employed agriculture
Irrigation	Share of farmland under irrigation
Q_F	Total value-added of all crops grown on the farm [gross value of production minus costs of seeds, manure, fertilizer, and chemicals] (1996 Rs)
Labor_F	Total labor input in crop production evaluated at village wages (1996 Rs)
Land_F	Total land used for crop production in "jarib"
SC_F	Share of Land_F under sharecropping arrangement
Q_W	Total value-added of wheat [gross value of production minus costs of seeds, manure, fertilizer, and chemicals] (1996 Rs)
Labor_W	Total labor input in wheat production evaluated at village wages (1996 Rs)
Land_W	Total land used for wheat production in "jarib"
SC_W	Share of Land_W under sharecropping arrangement

**Appendix 1: Definitions and Statistics of Empirical Variables (continued)**

Name	NOB	Mean	Std.Dev.	Min.	Max.
<b>A. Individual Level Variables for the Multinomial Logit and Wage Regression</b>					
D_primary	1635	0.129	0.335	0	1
D_middle	1635	0.127	0.333	0	1
D_high	1635	0.197	0.398	0	1
Schooling	1635	3.85872	4.654	0	16
Age	1635	35.26	15.13	15	87
Non-ag. wage	841	2759	2920	75.13	40000
D_permanent	841	0.451	0.498	0	1
Agri. wage	83	1574	824	150	5000
<b>B. Household Level Variables</b>					
<b>B.1. Applicable to All Households</b>					
Adult males	707	2.878	1.895	0	18
Hh size	707	9.301	5.251	1	45
D_land	707	0.518	0.500	0	1
Land size	707	5.756	21.302	0	300
AssetsV&E	707	11.964	51.824	0	952
Land size	707	12.834	24.395	0	435
Head's age	707	50.92	16.28	16	105
<b>B.2. Additional Variables for Non-Farm Enterprise Value-Added Models</b>					
Sn_primary	170	0.163	0.355	0	1
Sn_middle	170	0.150	0.329	0	1
Sn_high	170	0.168	0.343	0	1
Q_N	170	86330	67758	3250	299500
Labor_N	170	37158	26513	2240	129600
Capital_N	170	4777	8656	70	60000
D_busi.space	170	0.635	0.483	0	1
<b>B.3. Additional Variables for Farm Value-Added Models</b>					
Sf_primary	413	0.117	0.292	0	1
Sf_middle	413	0.080	0.243	0	1
Sf_high	413	0.121	0.294	0	1
Sf_literacy	413	0.318	0.426	0	1
Irrigation	413	0.465	0.395	0	1
Q_F	413	23175	30933	260	352440
Labor_F	413	4322	6314	50	87991
Land_F	413	8.091	9.199	0.25	90
SC_F	413	0.303	0.427	0	1
Q_W	323	9331	12153	90	123112
Labor_W	323	1624	2073	41.25	14742
Land_W	323	4.994	5.757	0.25	40
SC_W	323	0.327	0.452	0	1

Notes:

(1) Monetary variables are in 1996 Pakistani Rupees, which are deflated by rural CPI.

(2) In Panel B, households with negative value-added were excluded from production function analysis.

## Appendix 2. On Attrition Bias

Let the indicator variable  $d_i = 1$  if  $y_{i2}$  is observed in period 2 and  $d_i = 0$  otherwise. Suppose that  $y_{i2}$  is observed if the latent variable

$$d_i^* = \gamma R_i + \epsilon_i \geq 0, \quad (15)$$

where  $R_i$  is a vector of variables including  $Z_i$  and other identifying variables  $W_i$  and  $\epsilon_i$  is a standard normal error. Then the probability of non-attrition is a probit function given by

$$Prob(d_i = 1) = \Phi(\gamma R_i), \quad (16)$$

where  $\Phi(\cdot)$  is the standard normal distribution function. The probit model was estimated by maximum likelihood, yielding the following table. Results show that attrition occurred more on households living in Village A than in Villages B and C and on households whose heads were more educated. Other household attributes are not statistically significant.

	Coef.	S.E.	$dP/dX$
Village dummies			
Village A	0.749	(0.260)***	0.156
Village B	1.945	(0.307)***	0.406
Village C	1.404	(0.262)**	0.293
Household's initial attributes			
Household size	-0.075	(0.142)	-0.016
Dependency ratio	0.047	(0.084)	0.010
Head's age	-0.014	(0.102)	-0.003
Dummy for nonfarm fulltime employees	-0.045	(0.189)	-0.009
Dummy for regular remittance receipt	-0.387	(0.337)	-0.081
D.land	-0.114	(0.205)	-0.024
Land size	0.319	(0.506)	0.066
Livestock value	0.197	(0.207)	0.041
Net monetary asset	-0.022	(0.125)	-0.005
Other asset value	0.388	(0.389)	0.081
Education of household head	-0.201	(0.091)**	-0.042
Number of observations	355		
Log likelihood	-133.4		
LR test for zero slopes	42.70	***	
Fraction of correct prediction	0.848		

Notes: Standard errors were computed from analytical second derivatives. Continuous variables in 'Households' initial attributes' are normalised by their village means and standard errors.